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1Tropical Underdevelopment
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Perhaps the strongest empirical relationship in the wealth and poverty of nations is the
one between ecological zones and per capita income.  Economies in tropical ecozones are nearly
everywhere poor, while those in temperate ecozones are generally rich.  And when temperate
economies are not rich there is typically a straightforward explanation, such as decades under
communism or extreme geographical isolation.  Of the thirty economies classified as high-
income by the World Bank, only two small economies  – Hong Kong and Singapore – are in the
geographical tropics, and these two constitute just one percent of the population of the rich
economies.1  Since sea-navigable regions are generally richer than landlocked regions, regions
that are both temperate and easily accessible to sea-based trade almost everywhere have achieved
a very high measure of economic development.  Tropical and landlocked regions, by contrast –
such as Bolivia, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African
Republic, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Laos – are among the very poorest in the world.   These
points can be gleaned from Figure 1, a color-coded map of the world, where national income per
capita is indicated by the darker hues.  All of the major high-income regions – North America,
Western Europe, Northeast Asia, the Southern Cone of Latin America, and Oceania – are outside
of the tropics.
                                                          
1 In the World Development Report 2000/2001 the World Bank defines high income countries as those with Gross
National Product (GNP) per capita in $US 1999 of $9,266 or more.  The high income countries with populations of
more than one million are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States.  The
combined population is estimated to be 931 million.  Of these countries, only Hong Kong and Singapore, with a
combined population of approximately 10 million, are predominantly in the geographical tropics (about 36 percent
of Taiwan is in the geographical tropics as well).
2The pattern of temperate-zone development and tropical-zone underdevelopment can also
be seen within large nations that straddle ecozones, and within highly integrated, multi-national
regions such as Western Europe.  Thus, the sub-tropical U.S. South lagged behind the temperate
U.S. North in industrialization; Brazil’s tropical Northeast, though the original site of Europe’s
colonization of Brazil, has lagged the temperate Southeast for one-and-one-half centuries;
temperate Northeast China has long had higher per capita income than the sub-tropical Southeast
China; and of course Northern Europe industrialized roughly a half-century or more ahead of
Southern Europe.
These geographical correlates of economic development and underdevelopment deserve
an explanation, yet have been neglected by academic economists for decades.  Until very
recently, the outpouring of econometric studies of cross-country economic growth neglected
physical geography as a relevant dimension of analysis.  Powerful studies from outside of
economics, such as Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel, are helping to bring ecology and
physical geography back into economic analysis.  Only a few economic historians, such as
Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997) in a superb essay on economic development in
the Americas, and David Landes in Chapter 1 of his Wealth and Poverty of Nations, have
recently discussed the differences of tropical and temperate-zone production systems.  Earlier
fine essays, such as Lee (1957) and Kamarck (1976), have suffered an unfortunate and
undeserved neglect, and were not updated according to new insights of ecology and economic
development.  It is time for specialists in economic development, economic growth, and
economic history to re-examine the nature of tropical underdevelopment, and to understand its
roots in the combination of physical ecology and societal dynamics.
3  I would like to propose five hypotheses regarding tropical underdevelopment.  These are
by no means proved, but I think the evidence is in their favor.
(1) Technologies in critical areas – especially health and agriculture, but also construction,
energy use, and some manufacturing processes – are ecologically specific.  Such technologies do
not easily diffuse across ecological zones.  This point is stressed by Diamond in his pithy
observation that Eurasia’s east-west orientation facilitated a broad diffusion of technologies
across a shared ecological space, while Africa and America’s north-south orientation frustrated
technological diffusion by cutting across a swath of distinct ecological zones;
(2) By the start of the era of modern economic growth, if not much earlier, temperate-zone
technologies were more productive than tropical-zone technologies in crucial areas of health,
agriculture, and energy utilization, not to mention military technology.  These differences are
deeply embedded in ecological characteristics of temperate and tropical zones, and could not be
overcome through slight tinkering with existing temperate-zone technologies;
(3) Technological innovation is an increasing-returns-to-scale-activity, or as Adam Smith
would say, one that is limited by the extent of the market.  Temperate-zone innovation has been
strongly favored by a larger and richer population, which at least since 1800 has been integrated
in a global market for innovation.  This increasing-returns-to-scale property of technological
innovation is probably the main amplifier of the gap between the temperate and tropical zones in
the past two hundred years;
(4) Societal dynamics – especially the processes of urbanization and demographic transition
– are two further amplifiers of the development process, by which technologically laggard
tropical regions have experienced a widening shortfall vis-a-vis the fast-growing temperate-zone
regions;
4(5) Geopolitical factors – such as temperate-zone imperial domination of tropical regions on
the basis of superior military technology, and rich-country control of the institutions of
globalization – are further amplifiers, but their role is often exaggerated when not considered
alongside the underlying technological, demographic, and urbanization processes.
If these hypotheses are broadly correct, then policy solutions for tropical
underdevelopment will require a much greater national and international focus on technological
innovation directed at the problems of tropical ecology.  And since the social institutions that
promote technological change are inherently both market and non-market based, the institutional
underpinnings of enhanced tropical development will have to extend beyond market
liberalization and privatization as now advocated by the international financial institutions, a
point that I have stressed in several recent essays (Sachs, 1999, and Sachs, 2000).
I.  Some Definitions and Measurements of Tropical Underdevelopment
The tropics may be understood in two main ways: on a geographical basis and on an
ecological basis.  The geographical tropics are conventionally defined as the region of the Earth
in which the sun passes directly overhead at some point during the year.  Because of the tilt of
the earth’s rotation of 23.5 degrees, the geographical tropics include the area between 23.5
degrees North latitude (Tropic of Cancer) and 23.5 degrees South latitude (Tropic of Capricorn).
Some recent econometric studies have relied on latitude as a key explanatory variable for
economic development, most notably Hall and Jones, 1999.  And as we show in Figure 2, there
is a systematic gradation of average per capita income, with the high latitudes both North and
South showing higher per capita income than the low, tropical latitudes.
5It is hard to see why distance from the equator, per se, should be an explanatory variable
for economic development, except as latitude impacts economic activity through insolation,
precipitation, and other climatic factors.   Moreover, countries at the same latitude can have very
different climates because of the influence of land masses, wind patterns, and ocean currents.
Stockholm, bathed in the Gulf Stream, is at the same latitude as Hudson Bay. Latitude of course
will also affect proximity to markets, and therefore transport costs, but in that case it would be
distance from major markets rather than distance from the equator that should be the appropriate
standard.  Northern hemisphere locales would have a distinct advantage relative to the Southern
hemisphere locations at comparable distance from the equator.
Hall and Jones make the surprising and untested claim that latitude is really proxying for
the penetration of European institutions in various parts of the world, but latitude is an extremely
dubious measure of such linkages.  Many mid-latitude regions, such as Central Asia, China,
Korea, and Japan, have relatively weak links with Europe, while many equatorial regions are
former (or current) European colonies with very strong linkages.2  In any event, such institutional
linkages could and should be more directly measured by other means (linguistic, religious,
political, trade and financial flows).   In fact, when latitude is tested for explanatory power
against various direct climate or ecological measures, we find that latitude per se adds little if
anything to the explanation of patterns of cross-country development.
More useful definitions of the tropics rely on ecological or climatic characteristics as
opposed to latitude.  Of course there are a large number of alternative classification systems,
based on temperature, precipitation, growing season, natural vegetation cover, and other
                                                          
2 Consider, for example, the latitude band at 45 degrees North.  This latitude band passes through the United States,
Canada, France, Italy, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, China,
Mongolia, and Japan.  It is clearly unwarranted to suppose that location on this latitude band signifies a relatively
6characteristics.  In general, tropical zones are defined by high year-round temperatures and the
absence of winter frost.  Temperature patterns are typically combined with precipitation patterns
to distinguish categories such as the humid tropics (or equatorial or rainforest tropics), wet-dry
tropics (or savannah and monsoon tropics), and arid tropics (or hot desert regions).  Of course
specific ecological characteristics of an economy will also depend on topography (slope and
elevation); geology including bedrock, mineral deposits, and seismic and volcanic activity;
orientation relative to large landmasses, oceans, rivers, lakes, ocean currents, and prevailing
winds; proximity to markets; endemic fauna and flora, including pests, parasites and disease
vectors; and a myriad of other geographical characteristics, some of which are highlighted and
others neglected by any particular classification system.  In short, a designation of “tropical” or
“temperate” ecozone is only a first and rough categorization of an economy’s relevant ecological
characteristics.
In our research at the Center for International Development, we have recently used the
well-known Koeppen-Geiger (KG) climate classification system.  In this system, regions are
differentiated mainly by temperature and precipitation.  The world according to KG is shown in
Figure 3.  There are three tropical zones (humid, Af; dry winter, Aw; and monsoon, Am); two
arid zones (desert, Bw; and steppe, Bs); three temperate zones (sub-tropical dry winter, Cw;
Mediterranean dry summer, Cs; and humid temperate, Cf); two snow zones (humid snow, Df;
dry winter, Dw); and high-elevation regions (highland, H).3  The Cw climate (such as
characterizes India’s Gangetic valley) is classified as a “mild” climate, cooler than the tropical
climates.  It is, nonetheless, a low-frost region with warm winter months, and from the point of
                                                                                                                                                                                          
constant (and high) level of European institutional influence.  The same is plainly true of other latitude bands as
well.  If we want to measure European influence, there are many much more convincing ways to proceed.
3 There is also an E zone, for ice (tundra) regions, with almost no human habitation.  We ignore the E zone in our
analysis.
7view of agriculture and disease ecology it shares important characteristics with the tropical
climates.  Thus, when we aggregate the detailed climate zones into larger categories – such as
tropical and temperate zones -- we include Cw in the tropical zones.  Thus tropical climate zones
are Aw, Af, Am, and Cw, and the temperate zones are Cf, Cs, Dw, and Df.  The non-tropical
zones are all zones other than the four tropical zones, thus, Bw, Bs, Cf, Cs, Dw, Df, and H.  The
non-temperate zones, of course, are Aw, Af, Am, Bw, Bs, Cw, and H.
Using GIS (geographic information system) mapping it is possible to integrate climatic
and economic data.  We estimate the 1995 average gross national product (GNP) per capita for
the various climate zones in the following manner.  We first assign a GNP per capita to each
individual in the world, by using the finest level of economic disaggregation available for GNP.
For most countries, each individual is simply assigned the average GNP per capita of the entire
country (using purchasing-power-parity-adjusted GNP).  For several large countries and for the
European Union, we can assign GNP per capita on a sub-national level (e.g., states in the United
States, Brazil, and India, and provinces in China).  Individuals are also assigned to KG zones by
overlaying the KG climate classification on a digitized map of world population.  We also
measure whether individuals are within 100 km of an ocean coast or an ocean-navigable river.
The results are shown in Table 1, where we calculate the 1995 GNP per capita of
individuals in KG climate-zones, differentiating between “near” (within 100 km of sea
navigability) and “far” (more than 100 km away from sea navigability) zones.   We see that the
highest income per capita in order are the Cf, Cs, and Df zones.  The near regions are in all
climate zones richer than the far regions.  The economic dominance of the Cf-near regions,
shown by the colored areas in Figure 4, is truly striking.  This small area of the world has
approximately 8 percent of the world’s inhabited land area, 22 percent of the world’s population,
8and an astounding 52 percent of the world’s GNP as a lower-bound estimate.4   Aggregating into
tropical and temperate zones, we see that the average GNP per capita of the temperate zone is 4.5
times that of the tropical zone (4.5 = 1.94/0.43).  Note that the near-temperate zone has 6.3 times
the per capita income of the far tropical zone (6.3 = 2.32/0.37).
A low level of per capita income in 1995 signifies slow average economic growth during
the past two centuries, since the inter-regional income differences at the beginning of the 19th
century were much smaller than the differences today.  Using the very helpful data of Maddison
(1995) we can estimate, at least crudely, the annual average growth rates of tropical and
temperate regions during the period of modern economic growth.  Though Maddison does not
have a comprehensive set of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounts by country during the
entire period, he gives estimates of the aggregate GDP and population for major regions from
1820 to 1992.  As a rough approximation, we take the temperate zone countries to be Maddison’s
categories of Western Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, European Offshoots (the U.S.,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), Japan, and half of China.  The remaining regions (Latin
America, Africa, and Asia minus Japan and half of China) are non-temperate.  These divisions
are only approximate of course: for example, they put temperate Argentina, Chile and Uruguay
within the “non-temperate” region, and they include Korea within the tropical zone.  We simply
lack the data as of 1820 to make a finer categorization.
Based on this split of the data, we find the long-term growth process in Table 2.  The
temperate zone began the period of modern economic growth, in 1820, with an estimated per
capita GDP of $794 dollars (in units of 1990 international dollars), compared with $543 dollars
                                                          
4 For economic regions (nations or sub-nations) that cut across climate zones and across the near-far boundary,
we’ve assumed that per capita income is the same for all individuals within the economic region.  If in fact, as is
likely, the individuals living nearer to the coast, and within the Cf zone, have higher average incomes than others
9in the non-temperate zone.  Thus, the non-temperate zone had a per capita income approximately
68 percent of the temperate zone.  During the long period 1820 to 1992, the per capita GDP of
the temperate region grew at an annual average rate of 1.4 percent per year, compared with 0.9
percent per year in the non-temperate region.  As a result, temperate-zone GDP per capita rose to
$10,095 by 1992, while the non-temperate zone GDP per capita rose only to $2,556, or 25
percent of the temperate-zone level.
If we make the calculation with the Maddison data for the period 1960 to 1992, using the
same crude classification of countries, we find that both regions grew at a rate of around 2.3
percent per year.  This is a reflection of relatively fast growth in non-temperate-zone Asia,
around 2.9 percent per year, together with continuing poor performance in Africa and Latin
America.  It begs the question as to whether the tropical growth deficit has disappeared in recent
years.
I believe not.  Given the large gap in income between the rich temperate zone and the
poorer tropics, we would expect the tropical countries to grow faster than the temperate zone
countries as a result of various forces of economic convergence, such as technological diffusion
from rich to poor countries, and capital flows from rich to poor countries.  Barro (1991) and
others have repeatedly demonstrated that, all other things equal, poorer countries tend to outpace
richer countries in annual growth rates.  For tropical countries, however, this tendency towards
convergence is muted, if not eliminated altogether.
To examine the effect of climate zone on recent growth controlling for other factors, we
use Barro’s cross-country growth framework, in which the annual growth rate in GDP per capita
over a time interval is regressed on initial ln(GDP per capita), initial years of schooling, and
                                                                                                                                                                                          
living within the same economic region (but farther from the coast or in a non-Cf zone), then our calculation would
understate the share of income in the near-Cf zone.
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various economic policy and institutional variables.  In this now-standard framework, we add in
a variable measuring the share of the country’s population living in temperate climate zones (Cf,
Cs, Dw, Df).  Thus, the estimated equation becomes:
Annual growth    =     a0  +  a1 Initial ln(GDP per capita)   + a2 Initial Schooling
  +  Σ  ai Policy and Institutional Variablesi
  +  b  Share of Population in Temperate Climate Zones
When we estimate this kind of equation for the period 1965 to 1990, using the Summers-Heston
(1991) data set, the coefficient   b   on the share of population in the temperate climate zones is
consistently positive, statistically significant, and has a magnitude of around 1.6.5  This implies
that a temperate zone economy, all other things equal, would grow at around 1.6 percent per year
more rapidly than a comparable non-temperate zone country (either tropical, arid, or highland
climate zones).   It also implies that in the long-run, a temperate zone country could expect to
have a level of GDP per capita approximately equal to 2.7 times that of an otherwise comparable
non-temperate zone country.6
                                                          
5 One specific equation is the annual growth of GDP per capita during 1965 to 1990, regressed on ln(per capita GDP
in 1965), ln(years of secondary school in 1965),  the Sachs – Warner measure of openness for 1965 to 1990, the
average budget deficit as a percent of GDP for 1970-90, a measure of the rule of law for 1980, a variable measuring
the share of the population in temperate climate zones, and a dummy variable for Hong Kong and Singapore.  When
this is estimated for 69 countries, the coefficient on the temperate ecozone variable is 1.60 with a t-statistic of 2.8.
Similar results may be found in Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999). Meanwhile, the Hong Kong-Singapore
variable has a coefficient of 2.57 with a t-statistic of 2.8.  As discussed more below, the strength of this result
reflects the fact that, although Hong Kong and Singapore lie in tropical KG climate zones, both benefit from their
island geography, which limits the ecological preconditions for disease. Likewise agriculture plays no significant
role in these two service- and manufacturing-oriented economies, so the ecological conditions that normally inhibit
the development of agricultural technologies in tropical climates have not been relevant.
6 The long-run effect on the level of GDP per capita of temperate population is found as exp(-b/a1), where  b  is the
coefficient on the share of population in the tropical climate zones and a1  is the coefficient on the initial income.
According to the specification in footnote 6, a1  =  -1.58   and  b =  1.60, so the long-run level of GDP of a temperate
zone country would be  2.7  =  exp (1.58/1.60), or 2.7 times the GDP per capita of a non-temperate zone country.
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Will Masters and Margaret McMillan (2000) have similarly introduced a climate variable
in a cross-country growth regression model. Their key variable measures the proportion of a
country’s land area that is subject to winter frost.7  This variable takes values from 0 in the
tropics to 1 in the higher latitudes.   They find that countries without winter frost (i.e., tropical
countries) experienced approximately 1 percent per year slower growth during 1960 to 1990 than
did countries with winter frost, controlling for other variables such as initial income and
population, trade openness, schooling, investment rates, institutional quality, and other variables.
Of course, a few tropical economies, mainly in East Asia, have achieved rapid growth on
a sustained basis in the past three decades, and a couple of economies – Hong Kong and
Singapore – have actually become rich.  We will re-examine these special cases after we discuss
the possible reasons for the more general condition of poor growth and continuing
underdevelopment in the tropics.
Note, finally, that instead of running a regression of growth rates on climate, initial
income, and other variables, we could alternatively estimate a regression of the level of GDP per
capita on a vector of variables.   This is the approach taken by Hall and Jones, in which they find
that latitude band is highly predictive of GDP per capita (with higher incomes of course at
greatest distances from the equator).  We have experimented with similar “level” regressions,
and have found that climate and ecology variables (e.g., proportion of population within the
tropical climate zones, or proportion of population within a region of malaria transmission) are
highly significant explanatory variables for the level of GDP per capita, and that they perform far
better than simple geographical variables such as distance from the equator.
                                                          
7 Specifically, they measure the proportion of land area that experiences 5 or more frost days per winter month on
average.
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II.  Explaining Tropical Underdevelopment
Given the varied political, economic, and social histories of regions around the world, it
must be more than coincidence that almost all of the tropics remain underdeveloped at the start
of the 21st century.   For a long time many observers felt that the colonial interlude of the tropical
world must be the core explanation, and so they expected that decolonization by itself would end
this pattern.  Dispassionate observers, though, would have had their doubts.  Tropical Africa, the
world’s poorest region, was colonized only in the 1870s and onward, and yet the pre-colonial
period was characterized by the world’s lowest living standards.  Tropical Latin America had
gained independence by the 1820s, without decisive breakthroughs in development as of the late
21st century.  A few isolated tropical countries in Africa and Asia had escaped colonial
domination altogether without being propelled to high-income status.   I have little doubt that the
colonial interlude was adverse for economic development in the tropics, but it was the great
disappointment of the second half of the twentieth century that decolonization did not break the
pattern of tropical underdevelopment.  The roots of tropical underdevelopment are deeper.
Indeed, one should assume that the vulnerability of the tropics to colonial domination was at
least partly a signal of relative tropical underdevelopment.  As a very rough guess, the Maddison
data suggest that the tropical world had a per capita income equal to around 70 percent of the
non-tropical world in 1820, at the start of the period of modern economic growth.
An alternative explanation, introduced for example by Max Weber in his sociological
interpretations of capitalist development, is that modern economic growth is inextricably linked
to capitalism, and that capitalism is linked to European culture.  In this view, the essential source
of the temperate-zone advantage is that it is a European advantage, whether directly in Europe or
in the “offshoot” settlements of North America and Oceania.  This explanation as well cannot
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withstand close scrutiny.  Most importantly, the rise of temperate-zone East Asia – Japan, Korea,
Northeast China, Taiwan – undermined the once-popular case that economic development is a
European preserve.  Moreover, Europeans established colonies throughout the world – in North
and South America, Africa, and Asia – but the levels of income reached by these former colonies
is highly dependent on geography.  The temperate Southern Cone former colonies of Spain
(Argentina, Uruguay, Chile) outperformed the tropical American colonies of Spain.  Temperate
Southeast Brazil outperformed tropical Northeast Brazil.  Temperate Southern and Northern
Africa are far richer than tropical Africa though all parts of Africa were colonized by the
Europeans.  And so forth.
My argument is that the technology for production in the tropics has long lagged behind
temperate-zone technology in two critical areas – food production and health – opening a
substantial gap in incomes between the two regions.  A third gap, the ability to mobilize energy
resources, might also have played an important role.  This initial gap was then amplified through
economic, demographic, and political-military forces.  Since technologies in the critical areas of
agriculture, health, and related areas could diffuse within ecological zones, but not across
ecological zones, economic development spread through the temperate zones but not through the
tropical regions.  The discussion that follows, therefore, first discusses the ecological roots of
technological underdevelopment, and then discusses the main hypothesized forces of
amplification.
Food production in temperate and tropical zones
For the major staple crops – rice, maize, and wheat – productivity appears to be
considerably higher in the temperate zones than in the tropical regions.  As a general rule,
14
temperate zone economies are food exporters, while tropical zone economies are food importers.
The world’s main grain exporters are the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Argentina.  Grain yields
per hectare are considerably higher in the temperate regions.8   If we regress the logarithm of
grain output per hectare in 1995 on the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1995 (as a control for
overall level of development) and share of population in the temperate climate zones, for 145
countries for 1995 data, we find that productivity per hectare in temperate climate zones was 51
percent higher (exp(0.41) = 1.51) than in non-temperate climate zones on average (t-statistics in
parentheses):
ln(Cereal yield per hectare, 1995)  =  7.2  +  0.31 ln (GDP per capita, 1995)
                 (18.1)    (6.1)
                                                               +  0.41 (Share of population in temperate climate zones, 1995)
                                                                   (2.9)
Adjusted R2  = 0.39, N = 145
A recent study by Gallup and Sachs (2000) suggests that this higher productivity per hectare
reflects a higher productivity per unit of input, that is, a higher total factor productivity.
Many agronomists, ecologists, biologists, and economists have reflected on the lower
levels of food productivity in the tropics, and have identified several possible underlying
ecological factors.  These include: soil formation and erosion; pests and parasites; effects of
ambient temperature on plant respiration on net photosynthesis; and water availability in
conditions of high evapo-transpiration.  Let me describe these factors briefly.
A.  Soil formation and erosion.  One of the main themes of tropical agriculture is the fragility of
tropical soils.  In many tropical settings, soils are weathered by heavy precipitation and by the
                                                          
8 If we divide countries in three categories (tropical, arid, and temperate) depending on where half or more of the
country’s population lives, the average cereal yield in 1995 was the following: tropical, 18051 kg/ha; arid, 18540
kg/ha; and temperate, 37,288 kg/ha.
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rapid mineralization and leaching of organic compounds as a result of high temperatures.9  In
rainforest ecosystems, most of the nutrients of the forest are actually above ground, in the plant
matter itself.  Plant litter that falls to the forest floor is quickly recycled into above-ground
biomass.  When the forest is cleared for agriculture, most of the nutrients are removed, and the
nutrients that are deposited on the forest floor tend to be quickly leached by the rainfall.  The
soils lose their fertility after a few growing seasons.  This is the reason why swidden agriculture
(shifting cultivation with long fallow periods) are prevalent in the humid tropics.  Because of the
rapid mineralization of organic compounds, the soil structure is poor, and the cation exchange
capacity (CEC) of the soil is low.  Low CEC, in turn, implies that many tropical plants have a
reduced ability to utilize fertilizers on a sustained basis (Weischet and Caviedes, 1993). In
temperate zones, by contrast, the annual winter frost helps to forestall the mineralization of
organic compounds, and thereby results in an actual buildup of deeper and richer top-soils over
time.  Thus, while tropical soils are easily depleted of nutrients, the soil base in temperate zones
can become enriched by the natural buildup of soil organic matter (Powelson and Johnston,
1994, and Tiessen, Cuevas, and Salcedo, 1998).  This is a kind of biophysical investment that
results in increasing agricultural productivity in temperate agricultural systems, a point recently
stressed by Masters and McMillan (2000).
B.  Pests and parasites.  A second major feature of tropical ecosystems is the high prevalence of
crop pests and parasites.  Tropical ecosystems generally are characterized by a high degree of
biodiversity, which in a very general sense resists the monoculture systems that characterize
temperate-zone food production.  Monocultures in the tropics are prone to devastation through
plant diseases, pests, and other forms of competition with highly biodiverse ecosystems.  Just as
                                                          
9 There are exceptions, of course, such as volcanic soils (e.g., on the island of Java), where a deep nutrient base
supports a highly productive agricultural system without rapid soil depletion, or alluvial and floodplain soils, where
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with human diseases, the year-round high temperatures of the tropics, and the absence of
freezing winter months to kill parasites and pests, are the root of the high-burden of plant
diseases and crop losses due to spoilage.  The high prevalence of tropical animal diseases, such
as trypanosomiasis, has long hindered animal husbandry and the mixed crop-cattle agricultural
systems characteristic of temperate ecozones.
C.  Plant respiration and net photosynthesis.   Plants use part of their photosynthetic output to
support their own metabolic processes.  The net photosynthetic output is the gross photosynthetic
output minus the plant’s own respiration.  The rate of plant respiration, in turn, depends on the
ambient temperature.  Crops in warm climates have higher rates of plant respiration, and warm
nights in particular impose a high cost on net photosynthesis.  Chang (1968, cited in Bloom and
Sachs, 1998, pp. 222-225) has argued that the lower crop yields of grains and cotton in the
tropics compared to higher latitudes are an inherent result of the high costs of plant respiration on
net photosynthetic potential.  In many tropical regions, farmers locate in highland areas, with
colder nights, in order to raise crop yields.
D.  Water availability and water control.  Water control in the tropics poses one of the most
difficult problems for crop productivity.  Because of high temperatures, evaporation of surface
water is very rapid, as is the transpiration of water through plant surfaces.  The combined loss of
water from these two sources, known as evapo-transpiration, means that water scarcity can be an
enormous problem in warm climates even when overall rates of precipitation are high.  Almost
all of the wet-dry climates (Am and Aw) are subject to severe drought.  These climate zones are
also characterized by enormous fluctuations in year-to-year precipitation.  In the humid tropics,
by contrast, water control can be hampered by an excessive amount of precipitation, which
                                                                                                                                                                                          
soil nutrition is replenished annually by the silt brought from the mountains by river flows.
17
leaches soils, leads to water-logging of fields, and renders difficult the drying and storage of
grains.
Health in Temperate and Tropical Climate zones
The burden of disease is considerably higher in the tropics than in the temperate climates.
Consider the summary measures of life expectancy and infant mortality.  In both cases, the
health outcomes are significantly better in the temperate zones even after controlling for the level
of GDP per capita (included as a summary measure of overall economic development).
ln(Infant mortality, 1995)  =  8.6  -   0.61 ln(GDP per capita, 1995)
                                                           (29.3)   (16.1)
                                              - 0.74 (% Population in temperate climate zones, 1995)
                                                             (7.1)
Adjusted R2 = 0.81, N = 148
ln(Life expectancy, 1995)  =      3.2  +  0.11 ln (GDP per capita, 1995)
                                                              (38.8)   (10.9)
       +0.08 (%Population in temperate climate zones, 1995)
                                                             (2.6)
Adjusted R2 = 0.60, N = 148
The first regression implies that infant mortality in the temperate climate zones is 52 percent
lower (exp(-0.74)=0.48) than in non-temperate climate zones, controlling for the level of income.
The second regression implies that life expectancy in the temperate climate zones is 8 percent
higher (exp(0.08)=1.08) than in non-temperate climate zones, again controlling for the GDP per
capita of the country. The poorer health outcomes of the tropical regions will impair economic
performance in several ways, both direct and indirect.  The most direct channels, of course, are
through reduced labor productivity as a result of lost workdays, and reduced physical and
cognitive capacities as the result of acute and chronic illness.  Indirect channels, some of which
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are discussed below, include the effects of high burdens of disease on fertility rates, population
age structure, and overall population growth rates.
Health outcomes are, of course, a complex mix of ecological, economic, social, historical
and genetic characteristics of the population.   Ecology affects the transmission of many
important infectious diseases (IDs), some of which are inherently restricted to particular climate
zones.  Economics, of course, affects the ability of households to gain access to medical
treatment, and communities to mobilize measures in support of public health.  Social factors,
such as the status of women, or societal beliefs concerning health, can have important
consequences for health status.  Historical factors are often crucial, for example whether a given
population has had previous exposure to a particular disease.  And genetic factors can predispose
or protect populations from particular diseases.  It is well known that sickle-cell trait in West
Africa, a genetic polymorphism in the gene responsible for hemoglobin production, is protective
against falciparum malaria in heterozygous carriers of the trait, but results in deadly sickle-cell
disease in homozygous carriers of the trait.
Ecology can also affect disease through the interaction of nutrition and infection.  It is
well known that under-nutrition is immunosuppressive, so that poor nutrition disposes a
population to a higher burden of morbidity and mortality from infectious disease.  The same
disease, say measles, which may result in a relatively minor illness in a well-nourished child can
prove deadly in an under-nourished child.  Under-nutrition is itself a complex and
multidimensional phenomenon that may involve a shortfall in overall energy intake (energy
malnutrition), a shortfall in protein content (protein insufficiency), or a variety of micronutrient
deficiencies resulting from missing nutrients in the diet.
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The tropics are subject to a higher burden of disease for many interacting reasons: a
physical ecology that supports a high level of ID transmission; poor nutrition resulting from the
low productivity of food production; and the multiple feedbacks through poverty (illiteracy, lack
of access to medical care, lack of access to sanitation, and so forth).  Let us consider the issue of
disease ecology in some more detail.
Infectious diseases display many pathways of transmission between humans.  These
include: direct transmission (sexual or other contact, aerosol droplets of breath); vector
transmission (via mites, ticks, mosquitoes, flies, among other organisms); water-borne
transmission (often via a fecal-oral route); soil transmission; and blood borne transmission (via
transfusions, sharing of syringes, or blood exchange in sexual contact).  A major distinction is
between cases in which the infective agent lives part of its lifecycle outside of the human host
and those in which the entire life cycle is within humans.  When the life cycle is partly outside of
the human host, as in the case of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, trypanosomiasis,
dracunculiasis, filariasis, or in the case of many water-borne diseases such as helminthic
infections, then a sufficiently high ambient temperature is often a crucial requirement for
successful transmission between human hosts.  For example, malaria transmission generally
requires an ambient temperature of 18 degrees centigrade or higher for the anopholene
mosquitoes to be infective, and many helminthic infections are warm-weather diseases as well.
Many bacterial infections transmitted by a fecal-oral route are also favored by warm, moist
environments.  Bacteria that contaminate food and induce diarrheal diseases typically reproduce
more rapidly in warm temperatures.  In temperate zones, such diseases therefore tend to display
summer peaks in incidence, while tropical climates support year-round transmission and much
higher rates of overall morbidity.
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Temperate-zone societies of course have had their share of killer infectious diseases and
devastating epidemics.  Most of these diseases are of the type directly transmitted between
humans (tuberculosis, measles, syphilis, influenza), or transmitted by intermediate hosts that can
live in temperate climates (rat-bearing bubonic plague).  Some killer epidemic diseases such as
measles gradually evolved into less lethal childhood diseases.  Measles imposed a  major burden
on European society in the early stages of urbanization, since growing urban concentrations
supported the epidemic transmission of the disease among largely unprotected populations.  Over
the course of generations, however, the disease lost much of its virulence, as society adjusted to
endemic measles infection.10  Of course, the early urbanization and society adjustment to
diseases such as measles gave European colonizers an added biological advantage as they
subdued indigenous populations in Latin America, Oceania, and other isolated populations (e.g.,
the South Pacific Islands).
Infectious disease burdens were very high in all parts of the world until the 19th century,
but then declined markedly in Europe and the European offshoots of North America and
Oceania, while not declining in the tropical regions, especially Africa.  The temperate-zone
infectious diseases were partially brought under control through a combination of improved
nutrition, societal adjustment to diseases such as measles, improved public sanitation, and the
introduction of immunization, first for smallpox, and then in the late 19th century for diphtheria.
The tropical vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, yellow fever, and helminthic infections,
proved to be much harder to control.  While a yellow fever vaccine was developed in 1937, most
of the other tropical diseases lack effective immunizations until today.  Controls on intermediate
                                                          
10 The adjustment involved many factors, such as an earlier average age of infection (since measles infections are
less lethal at earlier ages); the acquired immunity of parents through exposure to the disease during childhood,
thereby allowing healthy parents to tend to sick children during epidemics; and perhaps genetic selection at the
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vectors, such as drainage of mosquito breeding sites to control malaria transmission, remain
vastly more difficult to accomplish in the tropics than in the temperate zones.  (See Hamoudi and
Sachs, 1999, for a discussion of malaria control efforts, and why they have been much more
successful in temperate climate zones).  And the tropical regions had less benefit of improving
nutrition and public investments in sanitation and clean water as additional factors in reducing
infectious disease.
Energy Resources in Temperate and Tropical Climate Zones
The differences in agriculture and public health are probably the most fundamental
sources of economic differentiation of the tropics and temperate climate zones.  We should
mention, however, the possibility that differences in energy endowments might also have played
an important role in the widening income gaps.  Industrialization was fueled, quite literally, by
coal and then by hydrocarbons.  Within the temperate zones, the location of 19th century
industrial development depended heavily on the proximity to coal deposits.  This is at least one
factor in the relative lag of Southern Europe compared to Northern Europe in the pace of
industrialization.  A relative lack of water power in Southern Europe is also frequently cited as
an additional factor.  In the twentieth century, access to oil and gas reserves has also contributed
to differential performance, though many hydrocarbon-poor economies  (Switzerland, Japan)
flourished, while many hydrocarbon-rich economies languished.
With regard to coal, deposits are overwhelmingly concentrated in the temperate zone.  As
of 1998, 10 countries accounted for 90.2 percent of global coal reserves, and of these 10
                                                                                                                                                                                          
population level in favor of reduced vulnerability to measles mortality.  Improved nutrition levels also certainly
played a role in diminishing the morbidity and mortality of the disease over time.
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countries, all but India (with 7.6 percent) are in the temperate zone.11   These ten countries also
accounted for 87.3 percent of global production in 1998, with India’s share at 7.6 of the global
total.  Indonesia also has sizeable coal reserves.  With regard to hydrocarbons (oil and gas),
global production in 1995 was 210 quadrillion BTUs.  Of this amount, 37 quadrillion BTUs
(17.5 percent) were in tropical ecozone countries (defined as countries with at least half of the
population living in tropical climate zones), while 173 quadrillion BTUs (82.5 percent) were in
non-tropical countries.  The share of global population in the tropical countries was 43 percent
and in the non-tropical countries 57 percent.  This implies that the per capita hydrocarbon
production in the tropical countries was only 28 percent of the per capita hydrocarbon production
in the non-tropical countries.12
III.  Forces of Amplification of Tropical Underdevelopment
In 1820, the per capita income of non-temperate regions was about 70 percent of the per
capita income of the temperate zones.  By 1992, as a result of slower economic growth in the
non-temperate regions, the per capita income in the non-temperate regions had slipped to around
25 percent of the GDP per capita of the temperate regions.  Since the climate itself probably did
not change by enough to explain the widening gap, we must surmise that various factors
amplified the differences already apparent at the start of the era of modern economic growth.  I
would surmise that three processes were most important: differential technological advance;
differential demographic trends; and the superior economic and military power of the temperate-
                                                          
11 The countries (with their share of global reserves in parentheses) are: USA (25.1), Russia (15.9), China (11.6),
Australia (9.2), India (7.6), Germany (6.8), South Africa (5.6), Kazakhstan (3.5), Ukraine (3.5), Poland (1.4).
12 Tropical production per capita was 37/2427 million BTUs per capita, and in the non-tropical countries 173/3224
million BTUs per capita.
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zone countries, especially as manifested through colonialism, but also through the control of
international institutions in the post-colonial period.
Technological change in the temperate and tropical climate zones
 It is tempting to suppose that the rich got richer out of a generalized tendency towards
increasing-returns-to-scale in economic growth.  Many models of endogenous growth have the
property that larger markets encourage more rapid rates of invention, which in turn spur more
rapid economic growth and still larger markets.  Increasing-returns-to-scale, in essence, results
from the scale-dependence of technological innovation.  Since inventions only have to be made
once to be applied repeatedly, and since the fixed costs of R&D are easier to amortize when the
end-market for innovation is larger, we would expect that innovative activity would rise by more
than proportionately with the scope of the market.   The rich, broadly speaking, would get richer
over time.
This story has merit, but is too simple.  It neglects the fact that innovation in one region
may diffuse to other regions, thereby speeding the economic growth of the non-innovating (or
laggard) regions as well.  Indeed, the broad experience of the post-war era is one of conditional
convergence, in which poorer countries, all other things equal, tend to grow more rapidly, not
less rapidly, than the richer countries.  Somehow that impulse towards convergence has been
extremely weak in the case of the tropical economies.
The relative levels of technology of two regions depends both on technological
innovation within each region, and also on the diffusion of technology across the regions.
Krugman (1979) offered a neat model of the “North-South” (really temperate-tropical) income
gap based on the relative rates of innovation in the North and diffusion of technologies to the
24
South.  To paraphrase Krugman’s model, suppose that the technology level of the first economy
can be summarized as  T1  and of economy two as  T2.   Economy 1 displays endogenous growth,
in which technological capacity  rises in proportion to the existing level of technology:
dT1 / dt   =  r  T1
The parameter  r  is a measure of the research intensity in the economy (and may therefore
depend on market structure, intellectual property law, transactions costs, taxation, and other
structural characteristics of the economy).  Economy 2 improves its technology only through
diffusion of innovations achieved in economy 1.  The rate of technological diffusion depends on
the gap between technology levels in 1 and 2:
DT2 / dt  =  f (T1  -   T2 )
The parameter f is a measure of the rate of diffusion of technologies from 1 to 2.
Now suppose that the relative income of regions 1 and 2,  Y1/Y2 ,  is simply proportional
to the relative levels of technologies,  T1 / T2 .   Let   R   =   T1 / T2   =  Y1 / Y2 .   Then, it is
simple to see that: DR / dt  =  r R  -  f (R – 1).  In the steady state,   R  =   (r + f)/f  .  The income
of the laggard country relative to the innovating country is then just   1/R  =  Y2 / Y1  =   f  /  (r +
f).  How far behind is the laggard country?  The higher is the rate of diffusion, the higher is the
relative income level of the laggard region.  The higher is the rate of innovation in the innovating
economy, by contrast, the lower is the relative income level of the laggard. Note, incidentally, if
the laggard region also innovates, but at a slower rate than economy 1, so that  DT2 / dt  =  r2 T2
+  f (T1  -  T2) , with  r >  r2 ,  then in the steady state 1/R  =  f / (r – r2 + f), so that the relative
income gap is reduced by innovative activity in economy 2.
My hypothesis is that the rate of technological innovation in the temperate-zone
economies was much higher than in the tropical-zone economies in the 19th and 20th centuries,
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while the rate of technological diffusion between the two zones was very limited because key
technologies could not cross the ecological divide.  Temperate-zone countries could more easily
partake of technological advances in other temperate zone economies, since they faced similar
ecological conditions.  This was certainly true of advances in public health and agronomic
systems, and was probably true as well of advances in areas such as energy utilization,
construction, environmental management, and new materials, to name a few key areas of
technological change.  Thus, there was a tendency for economic convergence among the
temperate zone countries, through rapid diffusion of technology, but a tendency for divergence
between the temperate and tropical ecozones, because of much higher rates of innovation in the
temperate zone combined with low rates of technological diffusion between the two zones.
A number of recent papers have shown that patent citations, one measure of technological
diffusion, are greatest in neighboring economies and decline with distance (Jaffee, Trajtenberg,
and Henderson, 1993; Jaffee and Trajtenberg, 1999).  Using direct measures of economy-wide
TFP, Keller (2000) also finds that technological spillovers decline with distance.  Johnson and
Evenson (2000) specifically address the issue of technological spillovers across ecological zones
in agricultural R&D.   They conclude that, “since Africa is far away from countries performing
most R&D, it is also clear that Africa will not converge even to other LDC output levels, since
they do not benefit from domestic or foreign spillovers.”  (p. 12).
Table 3 provides one measure of the enormous gap that prevails in the innovative
activities of temperate and tropical economies.  While the tropical climate zones account for 35.7
percent of global population, and an estimated 17.1 percent of global income, they accounted for
only 1.9 percent of utility patents issued in the United States during 1995.  The evidence on
R&D expenditures as a percent of GDP conveys the same message.  The tropical countries not
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only lag behind the temperate-zone countries in total R&D expenditures, but also in the share of
R&D in GDP.
Demographic transition and tropical underdevelopment
Relatively poor food productivity and poor public health have probably slowed the
demographic transition in the tropical countries, which in turn has amplified the difference in per
capita income across the ecological divide.  The demographic transition, remember, is the
transition from a high-fertility, high-mortality society, to a low-fertility, low-mortality society.
From the point of view of long-term economic growth, there are several advantages to that
transition.  Most importantly, investments per child (both at the community and household
levels) will tend to be higher in a low-fertility environment.  This is the famous “quantity-quality
tradeoff” much studied by demographers and economists.  Moreover, the transition generally
results in slower (or zero or even negative) population growth, and a higher proportion of the
population at working age.  Slower population growth means less strain on fixed resources
(arable land, mineral deposits, soils), and a smaller share of saving that must be devoted to
capital widening (equipping the expanding population with the pre-existing level of capital per
person) as opposed to capital deepening (increasing the amount of capital per person).   Recent
studies have shown that East Asia’s rapid demographic transition in the past half century added
markedly to the increase in GDP per capita, especially in comparison with regions such as Sub-
Saharan Africa where the demographic transition has been delayed. (See Bloom and Williamson,
1998; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Bloom, Canning and Malaney, 1999.)
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Poor food productivity hampers the demographic transition by slowing the shift of
population from rural to urban areas.13  A simple cross-country regression of the percent of
population living in urban areas on per capita GDP, proximity to the coast, and climate zone
shows that indeed the rate of urbanization in the tropics is lower than in the non-tropics,
controlling for income level.14  Household fertility studies have repeatedly demonstrated that
fertility rates are higher in rural areas, and especially in farm households, probably because the
net economic cost of child raising is much lower, in view of the positive contributions of
children to home production in farm households, and in view of the lower opportunity costs of
the mother’s time.   A high burden of disease directly delays the demographic transition, since
households compensate for a high rate of child mortality through a high rate of total fertility.
Indeed, given the desire of risk-averse households to raise the likelihood that at least one child
will survive until the old age of the parents, it’s easy to show that a high rate of childhood
mortality is associated with an even higher rate of total fertility, implying (within a reasonable
range of parameters) that high fertility rates more than compensate for high mortality rates,
leading to high population growth rates in such economies.
                                                          
13 Suppose that food is a non-traded good, consumed with a low income elasticity.  A rise in agricultural
productivity will result in a decline in the share of the labor force engaged in food production, since the same
amount of food can now be produced with fewer workers, and since the income effect of the rise in productivity will
not result in any significant increase in the desired amount of food consumption.  The result, therefore, of rapidly
increased agricultural productivity is a decline in the share of the labor force in farm production, and typically, a rise
of the share of the economy in the urban, non-food sector.
14 The regression estimate is:
%Urbanization, 1995 = -56.52 + 13.41 ln(GDP per capita 1995) +  7.40  (%Pop. within 100km of coast, 1995)
                            (5.5)     (10.65)                                           (1.95)
                          -9.25 (%Pop. in tropical climate zones, 1995)                    Adjusted R2 = 0.62, N= 149
                                      (2.9)
The regression implies that the rate of urbanization is 9 percentage points lower in tropical climate zones than in
temperate climate zones for economies at the same level of GDP per capita and with the same proximity to the
coast.
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The evidence indeed suggests that for a given level of GDP per capita, the total fertility
rate (TFR) has been much lower in temperate climate zones than in non-temperate climate zones.
The following regression, for example, examines the log-level of total fertility in 1965 as a
function of the share of the population in the temperate climate zones, controlling for the log-
level of GDP per capita in 1965 (we look at 1965, since it is fertility rates one generation ago
which have largely determined the pattern of population growth in the past thirty years):
ln(Total fertility, 1965)  =  2.97  -  0.16 ln (GDP per capita, 1965)
                              (18.0)    (6.9)
           - 0.66  (Population share in temperate climate zones, 1995)
                                       (11.1)
Adjusted R2  = 0.80, N = 106
The coefficient on the climate variable suggests that, on average, a temperate-zone economy has
a TFR that is 52 percent (exp(-0.66)=0.52) of the TFR of a non-temperate zone economy at the
same level of income.  For example, for an economy with GDP per capita of $5,000, the
temperate-zone economy is predicted to have a TFR of  2.6 births per woman, while the non-
temperate zone economy is predicted to have a TFR of  5.0.
Temperate-zone power and tropical underdevelopment
The third great amplifier of tropical underdevelopment is the translation of economic
weakness of the tropics into geopolitical weakness.  The tropics were subjected to imperial rule
by the temperate zone economies in part because the latter economies were economically
stronger, and able to translate economic advantage into military advantage.  The economic
balance sheet of the colonial era is still to be written, in part because this important topic is
relatively neglected by economic historians.  There is still a raging debate as to whether colonial
possessions contributed to economic growth of the metropole or economic stagnation of the
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colonized areas.  While it is certainly possible that economies might have grown faster as
colonies than as independent countries, my own guess, for what it’s worth, is that colonial
domination frustrated long-term economic growth of the colonized regions through several
mechanisms.  These include: the relative neglect of key public goods, especially primary
education and primary health of the indigenous populations; the suppression of higher education
among the colonized population; the creation of oppressive political mechanisms such as forced
labor and head taxes to extract resources from the local population; and the active suppression of
local industry in favor of cash crops and extractive industry.
One simple way to examine this proposition is to ask whether the level of GDP per capita
in 1995 is lower for countries that spent longer under colonial domination.  In a regression of
level of GDP per capita in 1995 on the share of population near the coast, the share of the
population in tropical climate, the proportion of years of open trade policy during 1965-90,
hydrocarbon production per capita, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country gained
independence after 1945, the last variable was highly significant and negative.  New states (i.e.
those born after 1945) on average showed a level of GDP only 59 percent of old states, holding
constant the other variables.15  While this is a very crude indicator, it does suggest that the
colonial interlude may well have been a significant factor in amplifying tropical
underdevelopment.  (The tropical climate variable has an estimated coefficient of –0.81,
suggesting that tropical climate zones showed a GDP per capita equal to 44 percent
                                                          
15 The regression estimate is:
     ln(GDP per capita, 1995) = 8.13 +  0.62 (% Pop. within 100 km of coast) - 0.81 (% Pop. living in tropical climate zones)
      (58.0)    (3.3)              (5.5)
               + 1.33 (Sachs-Warner openness measure, 1965-90) + 0.87 (Hydrocarbon production per capita)
                 (7.42)                      (2.4)
- 0.52 (Dummy variable for new states)              Adjusted R2 = 0.64, N=140
  (3.8)
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(exp(-0.81)=0.44) of non-tropical climate zones, controlling for the other variables, including the
period of colonial rule).
 In the post-colonial age, national power is translated into economic gain and loss through
the ability to write the rules of the game of international economic life.  The rich countries, for
example, have often used their majority vote within the International Monetary Fund to impose
draconian adjustments on poor debtor countries.  For twenty years, many of the poorest tropical
countries have had insolvent governments, burdened by un-payable external debts, and yet the
international system has delayed or blocked the obvious solution of debt cancellation.  The
policy has contributed to continuing low growth and instability in the so-called Highly Indebted
Poor Countries, a group of 41 extremely poor and highly indebted countries that are the subject
of special scrutiny and policies of the international creditor governments.
Tropical success stories
The underperformance of the tropical economies has continued in the past forty years, as
shown by the cross-country regression analysis.  A few tropical economies, however, were
successful in achieving “convergent growth,” that is, growth sufficiently rapid to narrow the
proportionate gap in incomes with the richest countries.  The most notable tropical success
stories are Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Mauritius.  Thailand and Indonesia
also grew successfully until the economic crisis of 1997-98.  How do these success stories fit
into the overall pattern of tropical underdevelopment?
Briefly, the East Asian tropical success stories are all characterized by two main features
(see Lee, Radelet, and Sachs, 1997, for further discussion).  First, they all achieved notable
successes in improved public health in the lead-up to their economic takeoffs.  In some cases,
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these successes were probably easier than in other tropical environments because of lower rates
of transmission of falciparum malaria, and for four of the economies (Hong Kong, Mauritius,
Singapore, and Taiwan) because disease control is easier in an island setting compared with a
mainland setting.  The dramatic improvements in life expectancy and infant mortality achieved
by these countries translated, within a generation, to sharply reduced fertility rates as well.
Second, these economies took policies to diversify away from primary commodities, and
especially tropical agriculture, in favor of export-oriented manufacturing activities.  The
governments introduced special economic institutions – such as export processing zones – in
order to attract multinational firms to undertake export-oriented production in their economies.
The result was that these economies were able to establish new productive sectors (e.g., textiles,
electronic machinery, semiconductors and electronic components) where tropical production was
not burdened by climatic or ecological factors.
In principle this kind of strategy of public-health led development, combined with a
conscious policy push away from tropical agriculture and towards export-oriented manufactures
(and now services) is more generally available to tropical countries.  However, in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the disease and agricultural conditions are so adverse that it is unlikely that most Sub-
Saharan countries could replicate the East Asian successes without a substantial increase of
external assistance (such as greatly increased funding for disease control activities).
IV.  Some Closing Thoughts
The most notable feature of global economic development – the continuing
impoverishment of the tropics – remains to be explained.  I have offered some hypotheses that
attempt to link underlying ecological forces with societal dynamics – economic, demographic,
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and technological.  There is much work to be done to test these hypotheses.  We at the Center for
International Development are hard at work on these issues, and I hope that others here will
become similarly interested.
At the core of long-term economic growth has been the continued development of
technology, a complex social activity that has benefited the temperate zones much more than the
tropics.  Policymakers in the years ahead should surely pay far more attention to technological
change, and to the supporting social institutions that foster discovery and innovation, if they are
to successfully address the special problems that face the tropical world.  Rather than continuing
to put all of the international energies into market reforms – as if markets alone could address the
special ecological and technological needs of the underdeveloped tropical world – it will be
necessary for the global community to find new ways to harness global science to meet the
challenges of tropical health, agriculture, and environmental management.  This is the theme of
Sachs (1999, 2000).
More generally, for the economics profession, the need to integrate ecological and
economic perspectives will only grow in the future.  As everyone increasingly appreciates, the
very success of economic development and the attendant growth in the human population, are
now putting unprecedented stress on the ecosystem at all scales – local, regional, continental, and
global.  Some of the greatest challenges in the future will involve a reorganization of economic
activities to support ecological functions, whether that is replenishment of soil nutrients and
water aquifers, or reforestation of watersheds now afflicted by massive erosion and flooding; or
protection of disappearing species; or adjustments to and mitigation of anthropogenic climate
change.  Many studies, moreover, suggest that it is precisely the poorest countries – with the
largest populations living off the land, with the most rapid rates of population growth, and with
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the special vulnerabilities of tropical ecosystems – that are the most vulnerable to environmental
degradation and long-term climate change.  I hope that our profession can join hands with the
ecologists, demographers, and geographers, to enrich our understanding of these critical issues.
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Table 1: 1995 GNP per capita 
Near Far Total
Af 0.66 0.54 0.64
Am 0.41 0.30 0.41
Aw 0.39 0.36 0.38
Cw 0.54 0.37 0.44
BS 0.80 0.49 0.55
BW 0.65 0.54 0.58
H 1.01 0.75 0.78
Cf 2.42 1.63 2.24
Cs 2.22 1.51 2.10
Df 2.67 1.22 1.90
DW 0.92 0.53 0.64
Tropical1 0.48 0.37 0.43
Non-temperate2 0.54 0.48 0.50
Temperate3 2.32 1.18 1.94
Total 1.35 0.65
1) Tropical = Af, Am, Aw, and Cw
2) Non-temperate = Tropical + BS, BW, H and E
3) Temperate = Cf,Cs, Df, & DW
Climate zone GNP per capita
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Table 2.    Long-term Growth of Temperate and Non-Temperate Regions, Maddison Data




Temperate 794 10,095 1.4




Source: Based on Maddison (1995).  The Temperate Region is taken to be Western Europe, the
Western Offshoots, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan and half of China.  The Non-
Temperate Region is the rest of the world.  We assume that half of China’s population is in the
temperate zone both in 1820 and 1992, and that the per capita income in both zones of China are
equal to the overall country average.  Data are from Tables G-1, G-2, and G-3 for Europe,
Western Offshoots and the World; and A-3a, C-16a, and D-1a for Japan; and A-3e, C-16e, and
D-1e for China.
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Tropics    2,019     5,893     1,880
World    5,653  34,519 101,330
Tropics (% of world)      35.7%     17.1%        1.9%
Source: Tropical population is the number of individuals living with the tropical climate zones.
GDP is allocated to climate zones by assuming that GDP per capita is identical for all individuals
within a country.   Thus, the “Tropical GDP” of a country is calculated as the proportion of the
population within the tropical climate zones in the country, multiplied by the aggregate GDP of
the country in 1995 (PPP adjusted).  “Tropical patents” are calculated as follows.  The U.S.
Patent Office reports patents by country according to the residence of the lead inventor.  I then
count as “tropical patents” in a country as the number of patents of the country multiplied by the
proportion of the population within the country living in tropical climate zones.









Note: GDP PPP = 1995 Gross Domestic Product per
person in purchasing power parity international
dollars.
Figure 1. Income per person, 1995 (with sub-national data for 19 countries)
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Figure 3.  Koeppen-Geiger climate zones
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Figure 4. GDP-PPP 1995 in temperate climate zones 0-100 km from the 
coast and sea-navigable rivers
